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INTRODUCTION
Email is widely known as an electronic system for exchange of messages over the Internet. However, "email" commonly refers to individual electronic messages, and usually only to the text of the messages and their attachments.
1 Email "accounts," on the other hand, can be analogized to the paper on which letters are written.
2 Along this line, accounts may be explained as some form of "physical" representation of email, enabling and regulating access to the content, just as papers are physical representation of letters and define access to their content.
Yahoo
Terms of Service, YAHOO! (Jan. 20, 2014), https://policies.yahoo.com/ie/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.htm ("No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability. Your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account will be cancelled upon your death. If we receive a copy of a death certificate, the relevant account may be cancelled and all its contents permanently deleted."). 13 [Vol. 14 password. Rather, he ordered Yahoo to provide the family with a CD containing copies of the emails in the account. 14 What legal regime could explain this result? One interpretation is that Yahoo owned the copies of the emails stored on their servers, but were required by the court order to make the information in them available. 15 For this justification can be found in the traditional division of rights in letters. Yahoo would own the emails-as a physical representation-but the deceased, as author, would own the copyright, transferred subsequently to the heirs. A second interpretation is to regard the deceased as the owner of the emails while alive, which then could be transmitted to the heirs of the deceased upon death. 16 This interpretation is less likely, as the court would then have regarded the rights of the heirs as overriding the terms and conditions entered into by the deceased, ordering full access to the account. The court only ordered Yahoo to disclose the contents of the emails, though. Thus, it can be concluded that Yahoo was found to have ownership of the account, and the heirs' were found to have a right to access the content of the emails. But the court refrained from establishing principles in relation to property, intellectual or otherwise, in email content. Instead, it focused on privacy issues. 17 Alas, the case left many questions open and provided little guidance that could be applied subsequently.
English law has been slightly more specific on the issue. In Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, Justice Edwards-Stuart concluded that emails could not be considered property. 18 The case concerned a commercial dispute between an ex-employee and the new owners of a company. The dispute involved important emails sent to the ex-employee, which had been forwarded to his private email address and deleted from the company server. The company claimed that the emails should be declared the property of the company. Referring to previous case law relating to the status of information as property in the context of letters, 19 Justice Edwards-Stuart identified a distinction between a physical medium and the information it carried, noting that only a physical objectpaper-can be owned. 20 The judge concluded that " [t] here are no compelling practical reasons that support the existence of a proprietary right-indeed, practical considerations militate against it." 21 Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the difficulties that property in information encounters conceptually. The court, however, wisely avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case was that of agency. The first instance decision, therefore, provides some guidance and an indication that in black-letter English law, emails are not considered property. This, at a first glance, makes it clear that we need to consider some other legal mechanisms in order to define the nature of emails, such as copyright, contracts, or privacy.
II. COPYRIGHT IN EMAILS
Emails are perceived mainly as works 22 created by their authors, the email senders. Therefore, copyright appears to be one of the most 20 Fairstar EWHC (TCC) 2952 [43] ("I disagree; there is or may be an important distinction between the physical object which carries the information -for example, a letter -and the information which that object conveys. A letter, which consists of paper together with the ink of the writing which is on it, is clearly a physical object that can be owned. However, it does not follow from this that the information which the letter conveys is also property that is capable of being the subject of a proprietary claim (for this purpose I leave aside the possibility of any claim arising out of copyright in respect of the contents of the letter)."; id. ¶ 58 ("In my judgment it is clear that the preponderance of authority points strongly against there being any proprietary right in the content of information, and this must apply to the content of an e-mail, although I would not go so far as to say that this is now settled law. Some of the observations that I have quoted are in terms that are less than emphatic and, of course, the two contrary views in Boardman v Phipps are entitled to significant weight."). obvious answers when determining the legal nature of emails. Historically, copyright protection of unpublished works was perpetual in the common law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and United States. 23 This has been changed, however, and the duration has been harmonized at the EU level, as well as with U.S. law. 24 Currently, copyright in the European Union, United Kingdom and the United States subsists in unpublished works for the duration equal to that of copyright in published works-seventy years after the author's death. 25 Additionally, an important change in the European Union resulted in incentivizing the publication of unpublished works. The Copyright Term Directive, and consequently the U.K. law, 26 awarded a person an additional twenty-five years of copyright protection for the first lawful publication of a work previously unpublished.
27
Emails and attachments unpublished elsewhere, therefore, could potentially qualify for the copyright protection as literary works. 28 However, publishing to a limited number of people is not making the content available to the public, and therefore emails would generally not meet the requirement of publication in the United Kingdom and the United States. 29 The content could, however, still by copyrighted by meeting the general requirements of originality and fixation, or recording. Fixation or recording would not create a significant obstacle, as electronic fixation has been recognized as meeting the requirements. 30 The U.S. law mandates that a work is only fixed "when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 31 The focus of this definition is on the notion of "a period of more than transitory duration." This has been interpreted by the U.S. courts in a number of cases, including MAI Systems v. Peak Computers, Inc. 32 There, the court confirmed that reproduction in RAMRandom Access Memory-are fixed copies. This finding is significant as RAM copies are not permanent and are only present while a computer is turned on.
33
In the United Kingdom, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act mandates that "Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work unless and until it is recorded, in writing or otherwise."
34
Writing is further defined as "any form of notation or code, whether by hand or otherwise and regardless of the method by which, or medium in or on which, it is recorded." 35 The statutory definition in the United Kingdom appears clearer than the definition in the United States, referring to any medium, therefore including digital recording as well. Accordingly, case law provides that "an artistic work may be fixed in the source code of a computer program."
36 Consequently, it is clear that the fixation requirement is satisfied in the case of emails. Emails are stored "more than transiently" on the service provider's servers or in the "cloud," and as such are definitely more permanent than RAM. .) (copyright in the following text (omitting "Dear Sir" and "Yours etc.") was held to be infringed: "Further to the writer's conversation with you of to-day's date, we shall be obliged if you will let us have full particulars and characteristics of 'Chrystalite' or 'Barex.' Also we shall be obliged if you will let s have your lower prices for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 ton lots and your annual contract rates. We have been using a certain type of mineral for some time past and have not found it completely satisfactory, and as we shall be placing an order in the very near future we shall be obliged if you will let us have this information at your earliest convenience" 44 The court opined that certain sentences or even parts of them could be copyrightable, depending on the originality of a respective sentence. 45 The judge went even further holding that "it appears that a mere 11 word extract may now be sufficient in quantity provided it includes an expression of the intellectual creation of the author." 48 The U.S. Copyright Office, on the other hand, outright denies registration of copyright in names, titles, and short phrases. 49 But even in the United Kingdom, single words are generally refused copyright protection-for example, "Exxon." 45 See id. ¶ 47 [T]he possibility may not be ruled out that certain isolated sentences, or even certain parts of sentences in the text in question, may be suitable for conveying to the reader the originality of a publication such as a newspaper article, by communicating to that reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of that article. Such sentences or parts of sentences are, therefore, liable to come within the scope of the protection provided for in article 2(a) of that Directive. 46 [Vol. 14 Authors of emails could also retain moral rights, on which the U.K. and U.S. have similar laws. In the United Kingdom, moral rights include: the right to be identified as the author, 51 the right to object to derogatory treatment of the work, 52 and the right against false attribution of work. 53 The first two rights subsist as long as the copyright lasts-70 seventy years post-mortem, and the last one lasts until twenty years after the author's death. 54 Unless a person waives his moral rights 55 -the right to be identified as the author and the right to object to derogatory treatment of the work transmit upon death, passing onto the person as directed by will, or a person to whom the copyright passes, or it exercisable by a personal representative. 56 The right against false attribution is only exercisable by a personal representative, pursuant to the same provision of the CDPA. The U.S. Copyright Act contains a similar provision as to the types of moral rights conferred to the authors. However, these rights expire upon the author's death. 57 To conclude, despite long emails meeting the requirement of originality and fixation, there would be a regulatory vacuum for a significant number of short emails. Therefore, copyright is insufficient to protect all email communication, necessitating a look at alternative legal mechanisms available to protect this content.
III. PROPERTY IN EMAILS
Black-letter law may suggest users may own property in an email's personal data and information. 58 Together with a copyright regime, this may serve to protect all kinds of email. There may be problems, though, with categorizing email as property.
A. Law on Personal Data as Property
Personal data consists of a user's name, address, date of birth, genetic data, religious beliefs, photos, among other things. It is 51 Copyright, Design and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48 § 77 (U.K.). 52 Id. § 80. 53 Id. § 84. 54 Id. 55 Id. § 87. 56 Id. § 95. 57 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 58 Information encompasses data, ideas, facts, and news, but does not necessarily used in the same manner by the information science literature. Nimmer and Krauthaus distinguish, amongst other criteria they use, differentiation of information by the form of information (summarized data, analyzed data, unorganized and organized raw data traditionally protected by legal regimes based on protection of privacy, undergirded by models based on human rights, torts or contracts. European countries mainly perceive privacy and control over personal data as a human right-establishing the EU-wide data protection regime, which is currently in the process of a comprehensive reform. 59 The United States, on the other hand, has been using a tort law model. 60 The tort model, however, has recently penetrated English law in Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall & Ors, 61 where the Court of Appeal recognized the "tort of misuse of private information." This decision has a potential to revolutionize English law on the protection of personal data.
Although protected under a tort-privacy right, personal data have not traditionally been protected under a property right. The advantage of a property regime is that, unlike a tort-privacy regime, there is no need for individuals to demonstrate harm in order to be able to protect their property-and this holds for both U.S. and U.K. legal regimes. 62 But for the property rights model to adhere, personal data must compose an asset or commodity. 63 This has been the subject of extensive debate. Nevertheless, proponents argue that a property regime would enable individuals to better control the use of personal data and to better share in the profits resulting from such use, and would force companies to internalize these new costs when deciding to collect or use others' personal data. 64 In addition, since property rights are rights in rem and can be enforced against anyone, proponents argue that individuals could protect 59 Most of these "propertization" arguments originate in the United States, although there are some examples in the European context. For example, Prins characterizes the EU regime as utilitarian-as it aims to promote the free flow of personal data-and therefore more receptive to a property regime than that of the United States. 67 Similarly, Purtova argues it would enable better control of personal data within the European Union, despite differences in property concepts between common and civil law countries.
68 She argues primarily for introducing the protective features of property with respect to third parties, rather than its alienability feature.
69
In an earlier work, this author has argued that due to the introduction of the right to be forgotten and data portability rights, the proposed data protection regulation is moving towards the propertization of personal data.
70
There are, nevertheless, notable disadvantages of the property model. For example, this model may produce monopolization of 65 "Data controllers" is the EU data protection concept, meaning "the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law." See The Data Protection Direction 95/46/EC, art. 2 d, 1995 (E.U.) (directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). 66 , with some limitations resolved by regulation, due to its erga omnes effect and fragmentation of property rights, has the potential to reflect and control this complexity of relationships. This may be considered an instance of property exercising its protective rather than market function; it aims at making sure that even after transfer of a fraction of rights, a data subject always retains basic control over his personal information."). 69 Id. information and prevent freedom of speech. 71 Additionally, the property model may encourage transactions in personal data, which arguably should be discouraged. The principle of alienability would allow the purchaser to then sell the data again, attenuating control of the original owner. 72 This argument, however, presumes the full alienability of property. This does not have to be the case. 73 Personal data could be subject to "hybrid alienability," 74 or a model resembling the limited rights granted under copyright law, rather than a "traditional" property right that would completely divorce the original owner from all control.
75
In summary, personal data has never been legally protected as property. Instead, protection of personal data has been provided through data protection legislation, as torts or by breach of confidence. Propertization arguments remained at the theoretical level, without an influence to the legislation or case law. 76 It puts forth workable ideas, such as "hybrid alienability," but evidence also suggests many problems in conceiving personal data as property. These problems notably include a conflict with the human right of privacy. Propertization of personal data, therefore, remains a theoretical construct, and a rather unsuccessful one so far.
B. Law on Information as Property
Information is not generally regarded as property in black-letter law, and especially within the English common law. For instance, in 71 74 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 2094-98 (discussing model of property rights in personal data, which would "permit the transfer for an initial category of use in personal data, but only if the customer is granted an opportunity to block further transfer or use by unaffiliated entities"). 75 See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1428-29. 76 See id. at 21 ("Post-mortem privacy (deceased persons' privacy), has been, so far, a phenomenon of interest predominantly for sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and other humanities and social sciences scholars. This issues, nevertheless, deserves the attention of legal scholarship . . . .").
Boardman v Phipps,
77 the court maintained that information is not property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationships. 78 There are some earlier authorities in English common law conferring proprietary character to certain kinds of information. 85 There, the Court of Appeal upheld an injunction to restrain the defendant broker from publishing information-the quotations in stocks and shares from the Stock Exchange-on the grounds that the information was the plaintiff's property. 86 However, this stance has not been supported in most of the subsequent case law. 87 Other rules of law, like contract, tort and breach of confidence, are desired instead.
88
In the United States, authorities asserting information as property vary significantly among the individual states, but courts are generally more willing to recognize certain kinds of information as property. 90 See id. at 236 ("Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public."). There, the Court used a classical Lockean justification for establishing state and federal courts have adopted the doctrine as a general rule of unfair competition, thus granting protection to objects outside the reach of intellectual property protection. But it has been widely criticized for its lack of analysis and superficiality. 91 There is a fear this doctrine protects objects that intellectual property will not, 92 potentially restricting access to the public domain and upsetting the balance intellectual property law attempts to achieve. 93 The doctrine has been a subject of wide controversy in American academic writing. 94 Nonetheless, lower courts have followed the rule of misappropriation set forth in International News Service.
95
In contrast to the misappropriation theory under U.S. law, England established the doctrine of "breach of confidence," aimed at providing protection for valuable information. 96 Breach of confidence is an equitable doctrine that can be described as similar to the American "trade secret law" doctrine. 97 In this way, a recent Court of Appeal case decided that confidential information should be regarded as a type of intellectual quasi-property in news, invoking the pains and labor that were taken advantage of by the plaintiff's competitor. The case was a base for developing the doctrine of misappropriation in the United States. 91 Similarly, in Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris, the court, writing about breach of confidence, declared that confidence's "rational basis does not lie in proprietary right." Rather, "it lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained." 101 As stated before, the doctrine of trade secrets is the American counterpart to breach of confidence in England. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act broadly defines trade secrets as any information that is secret, derives economic value from secrecy, and is the subject of reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy. 102 Trade secrets can protect many types of information, 103 and arguably evolved from a property regime in the nineteenth century to a combination of contracts, torts and property, and eventually to the unfair competition approach adopted by the Restatement of Torts in 1939. 104 In England that shift never happened, and trade secrets remain protected by the breach of confidence doctrine. Trade secret doctrine's proprietary roots can be seen in certain American decisions that describe trade secrets as primarily property.
105
One of the earliest cases deeming trade secrets to be property is Peabody v. Norfolk. 106 There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined a principle applicable to property law in general. 107 Regarding trade secrets, the court said that the inventor or discoverer of secret information does not have exclusive rights against the public or the good faith acquirer, "but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons." 108 Later, the courts continued to connect trade secrets to property. In 1984, The Supreme Court held that trade secrets are property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 109 Additionally, since trade secrets are intangible, the Court stated that the existence of a property right depends on the extent to which the trade secret is protected from disclosure. 110 Despite its proprietary origins and select decisions throughout the years, U.S. courts have never decided with certainty whether confidential information or trade secrets are property. In addition to intellectual property, American academia has counted it as part of torts, or something that belongs in the criminal law domain. 111 Commentators assert trade [Vol. 14 secret law involves elements of similar areas: property, contract, tort, fiduciary duty, and criminal law. 112 American trade secret law may after all be a fusion of tort and unjust enrichment law. 113 Still some believe this inquiry is not essential and that what matters is that the information is actually protected.
114 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that many authors still argue that trade secrets are intellectual property rights.
115
All things considered, U.S. courts and legislators have been more willing to recognize information as property. But the property paradigm cannot be used for all kinds of information and for all cases because it relates to commercially valuable information mainly. Although the property paradigm may succeed in the future, 116 only tangible objects are 116 Kohler & Palmer, supra note 87, at 206 (noting that the information might be deemed to be property in the future, and it would provide the courts with an additional instrument).
currently protected with certainty, 117 leaving the protection of intangible information uncertain. 118 
C. The Fairstar Case
The question of whether new, intangible information such as emails should be regarded as property arose in the recent English case, Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v Adkins. 119 This section will examine the scenarios identified by the court in more detail. Justice Edwards-Stuart's analysis of property in emails illustrates five different scenarios: 1) the title remains with the creator; 2) the title passes to the recipient (analogous to a letter); 3) the recipient had a license to use the content of the email, 4) the sender has a license to retain the content and use it, and 5) the title is shared between the sender and the recipient, as well as any subsequent recipient.
120
In each of these scenarios, Judge Edwards-Stuart focused on the unwanted consequences that would follow if the information in emails were to be recognized as property. Under the first scenario, (the creator of the email content retains property in it) he noted that the in rem nature of property would entitle the sender to request deletion of the email. The judge noted that this "would be very strange-and far reaching." 121 Under the second scenario (the recipient has the property right), he pointed out, similarly, that the recipient would instead be entitled to request deletion. In addition to that "strange outcome", he noted that further complications would arise if the email were forwarded to many recipients, who in turn might forward it to even more recipients. There, "the question of who had the title in its contents at any one time would become hopelessly confused." 122 Under the third and fourth scenarios (recipient and sender, respectively, have license to use the content), Justice Edwards-Stuart noted that a property concept and a confidentiality concept would be redundant. Namely, if information was confidential then property offers no extra protections, and if the information was not confidential then there would be almost no need to use property's protections. He concluded that a change to a property regime was not necessary in light of these options, stating that "there is no compelling need or logic for adopting either of LEGAL NATURE OF EMAILS [Vol. 14 options (3) or (4) and so in relation to these options I would reject a plea that the law is out of line with the state of technology in the 21 st century."
123
Under the fifth scenario (shared proprietary interests in email contents), Justice Edwards-Stuart discussed several possible consequences of the loss of information in emails due to technology issues. He argued that, in such cases, the affected party could not gain access to the servers of the parties with whom he shared property in emails. He concluded that "the ramifications would be considerable and, I would have thought, by no means beneficial."
124 Accordingly, he concluded that emails are not to be considered property. 125 Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the same conceptual difficulties. 126 However, the Court further asserted that this does not mean that there can never be property in any kind of information, as the inquiry depends on the quality of the information in question. 127 This would mean that information such as "know-how" might be susceptible to property, as opposed to personal data.
128 Accordingly, the Court wisely avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case was that of agency, stating an agent must allow the principal access to information sent on its behalf. 129 In another, even more recent case, the Court of Appeal confirmed this long-standing position and, in relation to the customer data contained within a database, maintained that information is not regarded 123 Id. ¶ 67. 124 Id. ¶ 68. 125 Id. ¶ 69. 126 "The claim to property in intangible information presents obvious definitional difficulties, having regard to the criteria of certainty, exclusivity, control and assignability that normally characterize property rights and distinguish them from personal rights." Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins [2013] EWCA (Civ) 886, [47] . 127 Id. ¶ 48. 128 Id. 129 "In my view, it is unfortunate that the agreed wording of the preliminary issue introduced an unnecessary complication into the dispute. The reference to a 'proprietary right' was a distraction from the centrality of the agency relationship and its legal incidents. No competing claims of third parties are involved. Fairstar's claim is against Mr Adkins. The assertion of a right to inspect and copy the content of the emails on his computer relating to its business affairs arises from the legal incidents of an agency relationship that survive its termination. That question can be decided, as between those parties, without a jurisprudential debate about the legal characteristics of 'property,' or whether the content of the emails was 'information' in which property existed in this case or could exist at all." Id.
¶ 46.
as property in English law. 130 Conversely, the medium carrying information is an object of property.
131
In conclusion, it can be generally argues that the U.K. courts do not consider information property, whereas U.S. law has done so more readily.
IV. THEORIES OF PROPERTY APPLIED TO INFORMATION
In this section, different theories are put forth to determine whether one may undergird a property conception of information in emails. None, however, are sufficient to accomplish this.
A. Property as a "Bundle of Sticks"
The particular framework used to examine these stances is the most widely accepted conception of property in common law systems: the "bundle of sticks" theory. In the information context, this theory encompasses the following 'sticks': the control of copying, access, modification, use, and disclosure of data and information. 132 Providing for all of the sticks in the bundle of information context is usually a complex task, if possible at all, due to the characteristics that differentiate information from traditional, tangible property. For example, information is non-rivalrous, 133 as possession can be concurrent and 130 "An electronic database consists of structured information. Although information may give rise to intellectual property rights, such as database right and copyright, the law has been reluctant to treat information itself as property. When information is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions between the information itself, the physical medium on which the information is recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical medium and the rights are treated as property, the information itself has never been. First, information such as facts, news, or things not qualifying as intellectual property may not entail labor. With information, there is no laboring on independent physical materials. 143 Other problems may arise with Locke's proviso concerning spoilage, as intellectual property and information are not subject to spoilage in the material sense. Although spoilage may occur if the creator fails to use all of the owned information in productive ways, 144 only the complete non-usage of works would result in spoilage, which would be rare. 145 Though this Lockean proviso may not exactly apply, concerns over the failure to properly use information are warranted. Some types of information (for example, trade secrets or personal data) may lose their usefulness and function if not used in the right time and exploited properly, a scenario that relates back to the tragedy of the commons arguments. 146 However, the "commons" analogy and its prescriptions may not be equipped to address these concerns, as it does with tangible property, for it is very difficult to define the commons abstractly in the case of information. We could borrow from intellectual property theory and consider the commons equivalent to the IP public domain. However, this approach would encounter similar difficulties that the public domain faces. The main objection is that the Lockean commons referred to appropriation order to achieve this, they argue that the law must recognize limited monopoly rights in creations and enable creators to recoup their investments. 153 These assumptions underpinned legislation as early as the first modern copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 1709. 154 Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution explicitly based its copyright and patent regimes on utilitarian foundations. 155 Utilitarian theory often develops on the notion of free riding and the aforementioned tragedy of the commons. 156 Free riding disables the creator from internalizing the full benefits of their creations, resulting in underinvestment. 157 If intellectual property protection were not awarded, those who did not create could still enjoy the benefits. The creators, on the other hand, would be unable to recover the investments, efforts and costs they incur in the process of creating and innovating. 158 Consequently, no creators would invest in creating. 159 Thus, intellectual property protection eliminates this phenomenon, increasing the production of socially valuable intellectual property. 160 How much intellectual property protection to afford, however, is up for debate. Landes and Posner recognize the central aim of copyright law as striking a balance between public and private interests. 161 This balance is struck when net welfare is maximized, resulting in "the greatest good for the greatest number." 162 For example, in the context of copyright, this means that intellectual property rules should be geared to "maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering copyright protection." 163 positive externalities are impossible to internalize, and that at any rate, consumption of creative outputs by many is desirable, as it enriches society and culture. 165 Therefore, as the scholar Lemley states, "[I]f 'free riding' means merely obtaining a benefit from another's investment, the law does not, cannot, and should not prohibit it." 166 Other opponents of using an exclusionary property right find that it is incomplete in striking an appropriate balance between private and public in the copyright context. 167 The problem in these justifications for copyright, as scholars Boyle or Zemer would argue, is that they emphasize the property component as a precondition for incentivizing creation, thus disregarding the role of the public domain 168 or the self-interested motivation for creation without legal incentives. 169 In addition, critics deny that intellectual property protection is always necessary to recover the cost of innovation. 170 This claim mainly relates to patents, as they are understood to require the highest level of investment in relation to other intellectual property rights. 171 To support this argument, critics present the examples of innovations that are actually hard to copy or reverse engineer, such as integrated circuits and hardware protected by obfuscation techniques. In addition, some innovators recoup profits by keeping them secret. Other inventors may distribute products in a way that is expensive to replicate, as is the case in motion pictures on film stock or encrypting data. Finally, in a constant circle of innovation, there is a phenomenon where first movers are able to recoup costs, as happens in news, fashion, and trade secrets. 172 expression, 180 but the expression itself may in fact " [c] ommodify what was declared uncommodifiable." 181 This question of alienability must be answered before the proper intellectual property protections are determined, for Hegel says nothing about whether intellectual property should be protected. Hegel simply claims that, if society adopts such a regime based in personhood, it is coherent to formulate it in terms of true property rather than some sui generis rights.
182
Personhood theory is applicable to information to an extent. However, because of their non-personal, commercial character, some kinds of information (such as trade secrets and fresh news) cannot be justified under this theory. In contrast, other information (such as personal data that is intrinsically tied to an individual) can perhaps find better support under this approach.
After evaluating these three theories of property and their connection to email-information, none of them are sufficient. Thus, the non-copyrightable content of emails, information, and personal data is not and should not be considered property.
CONCLUSION
Based upon current copyright and property law, and upon the western theories of property, the legal nature of email appears clear. Email content is not the property of its users. It can, however, be protected by copyright, the tort of misuse of confidential information, trade secret doctrine, data protection, or publicity rights.
Thus, there is a conflict between the law and the market, in the form of service providers in their respective treatment of email. Laws give rights to users with respect to their email content only insofar as it falls under the aforementioned protections. This falls short of full ownership protection, exposing a potentially large and indeterminable proportion of email content. In contrast, the market and other actors support a different conclusion: that users own their own content just as they own tangible property. 183 Ideally, legal harmonization should first occur between U.S.
